

## Testing Political Islam's Economic Advantage: The Case of Indonesia

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### *Abstract*

Across the Muslim world, Islamic political parties and social organizations have capitalized upon economic grievances to gain political support. But existing research has been unable to disentangle the role of Islamic party ideology from programmatic economic appeals and social services in explaining these parties' popular support. We argue that contrary to widely accepted beliefs, Islamic party platforms play no direct role in explaining aggregate political support for Islamic parties. Rather, Islamic platforms provide voters with information that serves as a cue to attract citizens who are uncertain about parties' economic policies. Using experiments embedded in an original nationwide survey in Indonesia, we find that Islamic parties are systematically more popular than otherwise identical non-Islamic parties only under cases of economic policy uncertainty. When respondents know economic policy platforms, Islamic parties *never* have an advantage over non-Islamic parties. Our findings demonstrate that political Islam's economic advantage is real, but critically circumscribed by parties' economic platforms and voters' knowledge of them.

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### 1. Introduction

This paper investigates the effects of religious and economic appeals on popular support for Muslim political parties. We seek an answer to a straightforward question: do Islamic party ideologies attract voters concerned with economic outcomes? Existing research suggests that Islamic parties may have an inherent advantage over other parties in attracting Muslim voters, due perhaps to Islam's scriptural focus on economic justice, or alternatively because of Muslim voters' association of Islam with other normatively good outcomes. As Evans and Phillips (2007) write on Algerian politics in *Anger of the Dispossessed*,

In the face of unending economic hardship, this vision of Islam offered a powerful pull because, in providing an all-embracing credo, it gave people a sense of new-found purpose and dignity (131).

Likewise, popular portrayals of disaffected youths and the urban poor hold that economic hardship in Muslim societies provides a critical impetus that drives voters towards Islamic parties and social movements (see e.g. *International Herald Tribune*, February 17, 2008). In such writings, Islamic political parties and social movements appear to have an inherent power to attract voters under conditions of economic hardship that non-Islamic parties and movements simply do not have. We term this view "political Islam's economic advantage."

Substantial conceptual and inferential problems exist in this research. The basic inferential problem is that it remains unclear if political Islam's economic advantage results from the essential characteristics of populist Islam, or is merely a consequence of Islamic organizations' persistence in societies operating under the restrictions of authoritarian regimes.

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That is, are dissatisfied voters attracted to these parties because of Islamic party platforms or for other reasons? Conceptual problems, by contrast, lie in the failure of existing research to articulate precisely how Islamic platforms attract popular support. Are Islamic parties more able to win over constituents with populist economic programs than are non-Islamic parties *with identical platforms*? Credible answers to such simple questions are absent from existing research.

We make three contributions to literatures on political economy and mass public opinion in the Muslim world. First, we clarify the terms of research, proposing a set of clear definitions of what “political Islam’s economic advantage” could mean. Second, we specify the observable implications of these definitions, and show the difficulties of using observational data to test hypotheses drawn from these definitions. And third, we use experimental survey methods to test these hypotheses in the world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia. We present results from an original survey experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey of over 2,500 Indonesians. In three experiments, respondents were presented with a hypothetical party and perceived economic outcome, and asked their willingness to vote for that party in an election. The experimental manipulations were along two dimensions: parties could be either Islamic or not, and their economic platforms could be favorable, unfavorable, or unclear from the perspective of the respondent.

We find that the link between Islamic platforms and popular support is more complex and conditional than previously recognized. When citizens rate parties’ economic policies as *favorable*, *non-Islamic parties* have a small electoral advantage. When citizens rate economic policies as *unfavorable*, *neither party type* has an electoral advantage. However, when citizens are *unsure* about economic policies, *Islamic parties* do have a distinct electoral advantage. Our findings are consistent with a model of Islamic ideology as a signaling or cueing mechanism

which is salient only when voters are uncertain over economic outcomes. We show that political Islam's economic advantage is real, but is critically circumscribed by the instrumental motives of voters, electoral domains in which parties compete, and voters' understanding of the likely consequences of parties' policy platforms.

Our use of survey experiments in Indonesia overcomes the main inferential problems in the research on political Islam and the economy. The choice of democratic Indonesia, where Islamic parties form and campaign freely alongside nationalist and multiculturalist parties, removes the inferential problems that arise when Islamic parties (or any other parties) are forbidden from participating in electoral politics or restricted in the ideological appeals that they are permitted to make to voters. Moreover, the experimental strategy that we employ allows us to pose directly the precise counterfactuals necessary to evaluate just how Islam—rather than other components of a party's platform—is attractive to voters. By construction, the questions varied only by perceptions of economic policy and Islamic ideology, so no other differences can be responsible for support for the parties in question. Randomizing party ideology and economic evaluations across respondents also helps to ensure that the respondents' baseline ideological orientations cannot systematically influence the average level of support elicited for a particular party type.

While our paper focuses on Islamic parties in Indonesia, our findings contribute to larger debates about the role of religion in politics. The idea that confessional parties might hold unique appeal among the faithful is an old and imminently sensible one. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, document clear links from religious affiliation to support for confessional parties in Europe. Other research has examined in various ways the links between religious belief on vote choice (e.g. Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Layman 1997; Legee and Kellstedt 1993; Manza and

Brooks 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2004). We turn this research around, asking not how an *individual's* religious belief affects *his or her* vote choice, but instead how whether a *party's* religious ideology affects its *aggregate* political support. Our answer—that religion matters, but in a subtle way—suggests important new directions for understanding the role of religion in explaining popular support for confessional parties.

The paper proceeds in five parts. We begin by reviewing the abundant literature on economic grievances and political Islam, linking the existing literature's findings with the inferential problems we have identified. We then describe the political landscape of democratic Indonesia, explaining why a study of mass public opinion in Indonesia gives us unparalleled leverage over the question at hand. In the following section, we describe the survey and the experiments in greater detail, and in the subsequent section we present our results. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for Indonesian politics as well as for studies of religion and politics more generally.

## **2. Islamic Parties and Economic Appeals**

Across the Muslim world, Islamic parties and social movements have tapped into economic grievances in order to win popular support. In Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) campaigns on issues of economic and social justice, stressing that Islam provides a set of guidelines for the creation of a developed and peaceful Indonesian society (Hamayotsu 2009; Mujani and Liddle 2009). In neighboring Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) has built a platform around progressive economic policies, anti-corruption, and Islamic law (Noor 2003). Pakistan's Islamist opposition coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), derives popular support from its opposition to both the American-led war on terror and to free-market capitalism, both of which it sees as inherently anti-Islamic and centrally responsible for poverty

and social decay in that country (Misra 2003). The Islamic Republic of Iran, borne of a social revolution against a corrupt and unresponsive monarchy, consistently implemented redistributive policies throughout the 1980s (Amuzegar 1993), and today the more conspicuously Islamist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, appeals to popular economic grievances to secure political support (Amuzegar 2007). The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey campaigns both on its track record in economic management and on its conservative religious stance, and rose to power in the wake of a painful financial crisis in 2001 (Öniş 2006). In Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood grew by stressing poverty eradication and economic empowerment in addition to Islamic ethics (Lia 1998:85-86), and continues these messages today in its electoral campaigns against illiberal regimes under rallying cry of “Islam is the solution”—to social ills as well as to economic hardship. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, before being banned, united disgruntled poor urban citizens with middle-class business groups under a platform of Islamic social reform, economic development, and pro-poor policies (Miller 1993). The examples and many others all share a common theme: an Islamic party capitalizing—or attempting to capitalize—on economic grievances to gain political power.

Such links between economic conditions and Islamic political activism also appear in non-electoral contexts as well. During the Islamic revolution in Iran, bazaaris (urban traders and small merchants) played a key role in the Iranian revolution, creating a “bazaar-mosque alliance” that combined frustration with the Shah’s economic policies with disgust with Westernization and the regime’s perceived anti-Islamic stance (Ashraf 1988). Palestinian Hamas, as a social movement, draws its support not merely from its strict opposition to Israel, but also from the services that it provides to ordinary Palestinians (Mishal and Sela 2000). Islamic social institutions in the Middle East, which appeal to broad middle-class constituencies frustrated with

the failure of the secular state to provide adequate social services, represent political Islam's "challenge to the secular state itself" (Clarke 2004:5-6). Other researchers have followed to show how welfare and social service provision are key planks in social movements throughout the Muslim world (see e.g. the contributors in Wiktorowicz 2003).

The fact that popular Islamic political movements so frequently emerge in response to economic grievances suggests that Islamic parties may have a unique ability to attract supporters during periods of economic hardship or stagnation. In both popular and academic writing on Islamic parties and social movements, there is a tendency to take this superior appeal of Islamic parties and social movements as given and unproblematic. Yet in the Muslim world, conspicuously Islamic parties occupy only a portion of the electoral landscape. Their competitors are parties that seek Muslim votes and field Muslim candidates but that campaign on liberal, nationalist, socialist, and other types of ideological platforms. The competitors confront the same economic circumstances and should have recourse to the same types of economic appeals to their citizens. Most, in fact, face fewer legal hurdles on organizing than do Islamic political movements. Why, then, should economic conditions drive Muslims to support for *Islamic* parties? The answer to this question remains unclear.

A central difficulty in understanding just how Islamic party ideology matters is the nature of politics in much of the Muslim world. In many Muslim-majority countries, restrictions on civil and political rights prevent elections from approximating true referenda on the political parties contesting the elections. In countries such as Egypt, voters may support Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood not because of the services that they provide, but rather simply because the Muslim Brotherhood is the most credible popular opposition movement in that country. Alternatively, voters may vote for Islamic parties not because of the material

benefits that they promise, but for a much simpler reason: because they support conservative Islamic platforms for non-economic reasons. Political conditions in many Muslim countries prevent public opinion researchers from posing the necessary questions to investigate such possibilities. Altogether, the counterfactual scenarios necessary to determine whether economic conditions drive support for Islamic parties are largely unavailable in observational research.

The problem just described is one of inference. Given the political environments in which Islamic parties and social movements operate, how can we ascertain whether their economic platforms give them an advantage over non-Islamic parties, rather than other aspects of the political platforms, or the strategic considerations that might motivate voters themselves? However, we believe that this inferential problem is a second-order concern. More fundamental is the conceptual basis of political Islam's economic advantage, which remains underspecified.

To be sure, there is no clear agreement that Islamic parties have any sort of economic advantage over other parties. Smith (2003), for instance, argues that while some bazaaris in Iran did ally with the Islamic movement which overthrew the Shah, they later grew to oppose the Islamic government due in large part to the economic policies that it implemented. This, he suggests, shows that analysts of Islamic parties must be careful in assuming any simple relationship between religion and political mobilization. Brumberg (2006) likewise rejects the idea of any sort of monolithic Islamic identity that shapes political behavior in consistent ways. Ottaway and Hamzawy (2007) stress that the Islamic parties' messages tend to be vague, and that to compete with secular opposition parties Islamic parties invariably couple their religious messages with redistributive appeals, patronage, and social services. But this again begs the question of why they appear more successful at deriving political support from this platform than are their secular counterparts, if not for their Islamic platform. Accordingly, some authors are

quite explicit that Islamic parties are uniquely able to benefit from linking their Islamic platforms to popular discontent with economic conditions: Vergès (1996), for instance, argues that the key to FIS' electoral success is its ability to frame "existing demands in ways that resonate with the dominant belief system" (293). Miller (1993) writes that the Middle East regimes face "internal pressure for more 'Islamic' government as a result of their failure to deliver economically" (47).

In what way might Islam resonate with economic grievances? Davis and Robinson (2006) provide the microfoundations of a possible mechanism. Drawing on classical interpretations of Islamic scripture as well as other theological elements that they see as common to Abrahamic religions, they argue that a worldview called "theological communitarianism" (which they find to apply across several Muslim countries) "inclines the orthodox to economic communitarianism or egalitarianism, whereby it is the state's responsibility to provide for those in need, reduce the gap between rich and poor, and intervene in the economy so that community needs are met" (169). Muslims, in this view, might be predisposed towards favoring Islamic political movements over non-Islamic ones in conditions of economic hardship, or when faced with many groups that promise to improve the distribution of public services or to eliminate poverty.

This idea that Islamic theology contains within itself a set of spiritual injunctions that lead economically dissatisfied Muslims to throw political support behind Islamic parties comprises an important first step in understanding the possible nature of political Islam's economic advantage. Yet even if it is true, it is coarse, implying that Islam's appeal is not only universal across individuals, but also not conditional on other factors, such as the policy platforms of other parties or the comparative attractiveness of different kinds of policy appeals.

To probe these issues further, we adopt a more nuanced view of the ways in which Islamic parties might offer economic appeal to Muslims. Throughout, our discussion is not about

whether pious individuals vote for Islamic parties, but rather where a party is better able to sway a mass of voters by appealing to Islam than it would otherwise be. “Advantage” here is a statement about aggregate popular support, not about an individual’s beliefs and vote choice.

### 2.1. Absolute Advantage

We distinguish several conceptions of “economic advantage” based on how voters can be expected to respond to the policies proposed by Islamic and non-Islamic parties. We begin with a possibility that is close to the one articulated previously, which holds that political Islam’s economic advantage is absolute. This conception of economic advantage means that holding all other considerations constant, voters always prefer an Islamic party to a non-Islamic one. To make this idea concrete, imagine two kinds of policies and two kinds of parties. The first policy is to increase fuel subsidies for the poor and working classes of a country such as Indonesia, Pakistan, or Iran, where such subsidies are deeply popular among the vast majority of citizens. The second policy is just the opposite, a cut in fuel subsidies, which is just about equally as unpopular as subsidies are popular, even though governments in these countries have argued that subsidy cuts are pro-development policies that reign in inefficient government spending. The “absolute advantage” view of Islam’s economic advantage is simply that an Islamic party offering either of those policies is always more popular than a non-Islamic party offering the same policy. So an Islamic party advocating fuel subsidy increases will be more popular than a non-Islamic party advocating the same, and an Islamic party advocating subsidy cuts will also be more popular than a non-Islamic party offering the same. In this conception, Islam’s appeal is consistent across policy types because of the inherent attractiveness of Islam.

In this first conception, the source of Islam’s economic advantage is the possibility that voters have consistent non-instrumental motives for voting for Islamic parties. This conception

does not preclude voters from also having instrumental motives, so that they may prefer economically popular policy platforms to unpopular ones (meaning that an Islamic party advocating subsidy cuts might be less popular than one advocating subsidy increases). It is possible to gauge the comparative weight of instrumental versus non-instrumental motives by comparing the popularity of such parties. The strongest version of Islam's economic advantage hypothesis is of a *non-instrumental absolute advantage*, where voters prefer Islamic parties offering subsidy cuts to non-Islamic parties offering subsidy increases. This would indicate that Islamic parties not only dominate non-Islamic parties, but that non-instrumental motives consistently dominate instrumental motives. An *instrumental absolute advantage*, by contrast, would find that voters prefer non-Islamic parties advocating subsidy increases to Islamic parties offering subsidy cuts, but that across identical policies, Islamic parties are always preferred to non-Islamic parties.

## 2.2. Conditional Advantage

In both the instrumental and non-instrumental versions of political Islam's absolute advantage, Islam's advantage is unconditional on the economic policy platforms that parties offer. They differ only in the extent to which Islam outweighs all other considerations. But these are strong arguments. It is possible, though, that Islam's economic advantage arises only as a product of the interaction between Islam and economic policy platforms, so that Islam's advantage appears only in limited policy circumstances that are themselves shaped by instrumental motives. The second conception of political Islam's economic advantage follows this line of reasoning, and holds that when confronted with policies that they oppose, neither Islamic parties nor non-Islamic parties have any sort of advantage. However, when the two party types both propose favorable policies, voters prefer Islamic parties to non-Islamic ones. In the

example of fuel subsidies, voters will equally reject both Islamic parties and non-Islamic parties that advocate subsidy cuts but will nevertheless favor Islamic parties offering subsidy increases over non-Islamic parties offering the same. This conception of political Islam's economic advantage holds that voters *reward popular policies by Islamic parties* more than they do non-Islamic parties. It means accordingly that voters' non-instrumental motives for supporting Islamic parties do affect their party preferences, but only when their instrumental motives have been fulfilled.

We emphasize here that the simple observation that populist Islamic parties have garnered widespread popular support in many countries is consistent with both of the two preceding interpretations of political Islam's economic advantage. Such populist Islamic parties may be popular because they are Islamic parties offering popular policies and Islamic parties are always more popular, or because they are Islamic parties offering popular policies and only this kind of Islamic party has an advantage over its non-Islamic competitors. Without comparing different kinds of parties across different kinds of policies, it is impossible to gauge just how Islamic ideology increases a party's electoral prospects or popular support.

A third conception of Islam's economic advantage is the mirror image of the second one. Voters may still have non-instrumental motives for party choices, but instead of rewarding Islamic parties that propose popular economic policies more than non-Islamic parties offering the same, voters may instead punish Islamic parties that propose unpopular economic policies less than non-Islamic parties offering the same. This conception of political Islam's economic advantage therefore suggests that voters are more likely to *forgive unpopular policies by Islamic parties* than they are to do so for non-Islamic parties. As in the previous example, this view holds

that voters' non-instrumental motives do play a role in their support for Islamic parties. But here, this role appears when instrumental motives have not been fulfilled.

At first glance, the idea that Islam's economic advantage appears only in contexts where Islamic parties' policies are unpopular seems improbable. Presumably, this view would be ill-suited to explain the primary motivating examples of this paper—PKS' stress on pro-development policy in Indonesia, FIS' popularity in Algeria, or the AKP's popularity in Turkey. But aside from logical completeness, there are some reasons to take this view of Islam's economic advantage seriously. It may be that Islamic mass organizations in war-torn countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan are more likely than non-Islamic counterparts to secure power despite their ruthless means because of the inherent advantage they have in appealing to Islam. In other words, when choosing among violent and confiscatory warlords, an Islamic one is preferable to a non-Islamic one. To take a less extreme example, Iran's Islamic government has survived years of economic stagnation, which might have generated mass backlash against a more secular government, perhaps due to its fealty to Islamic principles. And in democratic countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh, small and relatively unpopular Islamic parties may be nevertheless more popular than they would otherwise be if they campaigned as secular or nationalist parties. But again, absent comparisons of bad policies with good ones (of warlords with benevolent social planners, or of popular economic platforms by Islamic parties with unpopular economic platforms by Islamic parties) these casual observations alone are also consistent with the absolute view of political Islam's economic advantage.

### 2.3. Uncertainty and Vote Choice

A fourth view of political Islam's economic advantage takes a different view of what Islam does. Instead of focusing on how voters respond to the concrete economic policies, it

instead concentrates on another key feature of politics: decision-making under uncertainty. Voters choosing candidates for office face at least three kinds of uncertainty over economic policies. The first is uncertainty over policies: voters may not actually know parties' economic policies, both as a consequence of rational ignorance (Schumpeter 1962) and as a consequence of parties' inability to communicate perfectly to voters their policy platforms (Banks 1990). The second is uncertainty over outcomes: voters may know policy platforms but not know how policies that the parties plan to adopt will affect them. In the classic statement of this uncertainty problem, focusing on policy reform (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991), opposition to reform stems from voters' ignorance over who among them will lose out from reforms under consideration. The third kind of uncertainty is uncertainty over implementation: even if voters are certain about policy platforms and their consequences, they may be uncertain of (or at least concerned about) a party's ability to commit *ex ante* to adopt costly policies *ex post* (Besley and Coate 1998).

Theoretical work on uncertainty, policies, and voter choice suggests that partisanship or ideology can help to signal to voters the true intentions of politicians, thereby attracting voters to parties even given uncertainty (e.g. Wärneryd 1994). Recently, Karthik and McAfee (2007) have offered "character" and "integrity" as characteristics that voters may view as desirable in signaling candidates' expected future behavior.<sup>1</sup> Alternatively, in conditions of uncertainty over the downstream consequences of a party's economic policy platform, when voters are unable to choose politicians whose policies are most consistent with their own, they may look for alternative reasons to support a party, such as an ideology that is normatively good independently of parties' other policies. Following Stokes (1963:373), such "valence-

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<sup>1</sup> Karthik and McAfee (2007) hold that candidates may offer unpopular policies in order to reveal character; we do not explore this mechanism here.

issues...involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate.”

In all of these cases of voters facing uncertainty, an Islamic party ideology may serve as a cueing mechanism or informational shortcut that communicates something positive about a party’s policy intentions. Linking Islam to a party’s economic platform may do this if voters are predisposed to associating religious piety with other normatively good outcomes (as per Davis and Robinson 2006), and hence voters—who face a problem of uncertainty about policies adopted *ex post*—believe *ex ante* that Islamic parties are more likely to adopt good policies than are non-Islamic parties. Political Islam’s economic advantage operates not in conditions where voters evaluate party platforms as good or bad, but specifically when voters are uncertain about how to evaluate party platforms. This view of Islam’s economic advantage holds that voters *cue on Islamic ideology* under conditions of policy uncertainty.

#### 2.4. Islamic Irrelevance

The previous sections have suggested four possible ways in which appealing to Islamic ideology may give a political party an advantage in campaigning on economic ideology. But there is a fifth possibility, one that is often unarticulated but which plays a critical role in our analysis. This is the null hypothesis; in other words, the possibility that there is actually no inherent advantage to being an Islamic party. If this is true, what appears to be political Islam’s economic advantage is entirely the result of contextual political factors present in some Muslim majority countries. How might this occur? One possibility is if non-Islamic opposition parties are weak and ineffectual, leading any anti-incumbent voter to vote for an Islamic party for reasons having nothing to do with Islam itself. Khoury (1983), for instance, attributes the rise of “Islamic revivalism” to the failure of the secular state in the Middle East to deliver upon its promises of

development and human security, and the Islamic character of this revival to the fact that all leftist opponents to the secular state have been thoroughly discredited. Here, Islam succeeds because it is the only credible game in town for opponents of the regime. Alternatively, it may be that non-Islamic parties simply are less sensitive, for whatever reason, to the demands of ordinary citizens, rendering them unwilling or unable to offer the sorts of popular policies that Islamic parties can. Writes Fuller (2002:52): “secular Turks continue to elect Islamist mayors in major cities across the country...because they deliver what constituents want.” In both cases, what appear to be votes for Islamic parties are actually nothing more than votes for preferred policies. The role of Islamic parties is that they happen to offer the policies that voters want. Here, instrumental motives not only dominate non-instrumental motives, non-instrumental motives do not actually affect party support at all.

As Bellin (2008) notes, the intellectual roots of this view that religion is truly irrelevant for political behavior—and hence, for our study, that vote choices that appears to be motivated by religion are actually motivated by economic policy preferences—lie in the works of nineteenth century social theory. But there are more recent analogues which offer similar perspectives. Norris and Inglehart (2004), for example, propose that variations in religiosity across individuals and societies can be traced to people’s concern with “existential security.” McCleary and Barro (2004) find that economic development is negatively associated with religious behavior. While neither set of authors would argue that religion is purely false consciousness, and only the former directly address the link between religious practice and votes for religious parties, their arguments do establish that close attention to the economic foundations of religious participation may lead to some suspicion that religion actually has systematic effects on vote choice. Moreover, both Dogan (2000) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) find that the link

between religious cleavages and vote choice in Europe most rigorously documented in Lipset and Rokkan (1967) appears to have disappeared in recent years. Such findings in non-Muslim contexts lead us to take the null hypothesis seriously. We must be careful to test if an Islamic platform confers *any advantage at all* over different ideologies.

## 2.5. Observing “Advantage”

Given these five conceptual possibilities of economic advantage, we can gauge the extent to which political Islam comports to each using only six quantities of interest. We summarize these in Table 1.

\*\*\* Table 1 here \*\*\*

The letter in each cell corresponds to the average level of support across citizens for a party of type denoted in the columns that offers the economic platform in the rows.

Absolute advantage holds that Islamic parties offering any policy type are always more popular than non-Islamic policies offering the same. If this is true, then the average level of support for an Islamic party offering good policies (denoted A in Table 1) should be significantly larger than the average level of support for non-Islamic parties offering good policies (denoted B). The same should be true for both other economic policy platforms: C should be larger than D, and E should be larger than F. Moreover, if the non-instrumental version of the absolute advantage thesis is correct, then in addition to the above, both C and E should be larger than B, indicating that any Islamic party is more popular than a non-Islamic party even when the latter offers favorable policies.

The next two conceptions are conditional. If political Islam’s economic advantage exists because voters reward Islamic parties for offering good policies, then we should expect A to be larger than B but no difference between E and F. This view makes no claim about Islam’s role

under conditions of uncertainty, so we hold simply that C here should be greater than or equal to D.

If political Islam's economic advantage exists because voters forgive Islamic parties offering bad policies, then our predictions are reversed. A and B should be no different, but E should be larger than F. For the same reasons as stated previously, we hold again that for this conception to be true C should be greater than or equal to D.

Alternatively, if Islam is a cueing device that operates under conditions of uncertainty, we should expect different dynamics. Now, when voters are sure about policy types, there should be no difference between average support for either Islamic or non-Islamic parties. So A and B should be roughly equal, and at the same time, E and F should be roughly equal. But when voters are uncertain about economic policy platforms, Islamic parties should be relatively more popular, meaning that C should be larger than D.

Finally, if the null hypothesis is true—if Islamic parties gain no fundamental advantage due to Islam—then we should observe the following: A and B should be roughly equal, C and D should be roughly equal, and E and F should be roughly equal. However, we do expect to see that economic policy still makes a difference. Both A and B should be greater than both C and D, which in turn should be greater than both E and F.

It is worth pausing here to consider how these quantities of interest allow us to think about the inferential problems that existing observational studies face. The optimal case for studying the role of Islam is a country like Indonesia, a democracy in which a number of non-Islamic parties compete with several Islamic ones. As we show, Islamic parties continue to struggle to attract the type of electoral support that the non-Islamic parties have drawn, suggesting that in the world's largest Muslim democracy, the pull of Islam does not dominate all

other considerations. But unless we can ensure that we are comparing two parties whose economic platforms are identical, we do not have the necessary data to distinguish the failure of Islam to influence voters from a failure of economic policies or other considerations. There still remains the task of disentangling the influence of Islam from the influence of other party ideologies in attracting voters. And even so, we have no way to ascertain from observational data alone why Islamic party platforms have not produced widespread political support in Indonesia. Is it because Islamic party platforms have no appeal to voters, or alternatively because Islamic parties have failed to establish the economic policy credibility necessary to compete with non-Islamic parties?

Now consider the majority of other cases in the Muslim world. In Turkey, for example, for most of the twentieth century a secular establishment delivered inconsistent economic performance while failing to address the fundamental social upheavals that have accompanied modernization. Since 2001, the AKP has attracted significant popular support while campaigning on business-friendly yet socially-minded developmentalist principles. Yet just observing this fact does not allow us to separate the effects of Islam from economic policy in shaping the AKP's popularity. Following Table 1, all we can hope to observe is something akin to a comparison between cell A and cell F. But this comparison gives us precisely no insight as to the existence or structure of political Islam's economic advantage. As it is, the importance of Islam for the AKP's success remains a topic of debate. Authors such as Fuller (2002) argue that the AKP's development policies drive its popularity, while others such as Somer (2007) see middle-class conservative Islamists, who support the AKP's pro-Islam platform, as its key constituency.

Even more difficult is the case of Iran, where avowedly secular political parties have been effectively banned by the Guardian Council since the early 1980s. While the remaining

parties vary in their ideological orientations, all maintain some version of Islam as their ideological core. Yet parties also vary in their economic policy outlooks, from reformists to conservatives to populists. And candidates employ both Islamic symbols and economic policy pledges to win votes, from Mohammad Khatami's advocacy of economic reform and modernization to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's populist rhetoric and more hardline Islamic stance. What role does Islam play in attracting voters to parties? Perhaps some, but absent parties that fall into the right hand column of Table 1, we cannot use observational data to evaluate how much of a role Islam plays.

The unique benefit of our experimental survey approach, to which we now turn, is that we can directly observe all of these quantities of interest. This allows us literally to fill in the cells in Table 1 with the data necessary to analyze the nature of political Islam's economic advantage.

### **3. The Method and the Indonesian Case**

All conceptions of political Islam's economic advantage are claims about voter preferences. As such, we base our analysis on the average level of popular support for different kinds of political parties, and we elicit these data using public opinion surveys. Our first task is to determine the proper population from which to draw our respondents. The ideal political context in which to pose questions that compare Islamic parties with non-Islamic parties will meet three criteria. First, the context must be one in which an Islamic party has a conceivable possibility of victory campaigning as such. Second, parties should face no restrictions on their legal ability to campaign as Islamic versus secular, nationalist, liberal, or other kinds of parties. Third, elections must be legitimate contests among political parties, so that respondents understand hypothetical elections to be referenda about parties and their platforms. To fulfill the

first criterion, we need data from Muslim respondents living in Muslim-majority countries; to fulfill the second, we need countries in which parties are free to organize around political ideologies of their own choosing; and to fulfill the third, we need a country in which elections are free and fair by global standards.

In Table 2, we report data about contemporary political conditions Muslim majority or Muslim-plurality<sup>2</sup> countries from the 2009 release of Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* survey (Freedom House 2009). We rely on Freedom House as our primary source for comparing political regimes because it collects data not only on the existence of free and fair elections (the third criterion) but also because it comments on the ability of individuals to participate in politics and on political parties and organizations to form and organize (the second criterion). Both the 2007 release of the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and Cheibub and Gandhi's (2004) update and extension of the Alvarez et al. (1996) binary regime coding yield qualitatively identical results on political regimes, but by design yield only some insight about civil and political liberties.

\*\*\* Table 2 here \*\*\*

The data show that few political regimes in the Muslim world meet basic standards of democratic electoral competition. Among those that do, however, political freedoms remain circumscribed by legal restrictions on campaigning and participation. In large Muslim-majority countries such as Bangladesh, elections have historically been contested among both Islamic and non-Islamic parties, but in 2007 a series of corruption scandals led the military to intervene in electoral politics, postponing elections until December 2008 and raising questions about the consolidation of democracy in that country. Likewise, Pakistan only returned to democratic rule

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<sup>2</sup> Several countries in west Africa report highly variable figures for religious adherence. These include Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. A substantial number of Ethiopians are Muslims, but they are a minority if compared to Christians, Jews, and animists together. Eritrea and Nigeria are each approximately fifty-percent Muslim.

in late 2007. In Turkey, by contrast, the secular military establishment exerts a powerful check on the ability of Islamic parties to campaign as such, for doing so would contradict the secular Kemalist ideology upon which the modern Turkish state was built.

The two exceptions to the overall trend of non-democratic or illiberal politics in the Muslim world are Indonesia and Mali. Both are predominantly Muslim democracies, and both have relatively high levels of political freedom. But in Mali, *laïcité* is enshrined in the constitution, which explicitly forbids political parties from appealing to religious principles. Today, Islam in Mali appears to play a growing role in public life, but no political parties espouse Islamic ideologies (Soares 2006). Accordingly, political conditions in Indonesia—which in addition to being a consolidated multiparty democracy, is by far the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country—best approximate those necessary to investigate political Islam’s economic advantage.

### 3.1. The Indonesian Case

Since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has transformed from a dictatorship into a vibrant multiparty democracy with very few legal restrictions on mass political organization. Political parties in Indonesia range from avowedly pluralist social democratic parties to openly Islamic parties, some of which advocate the imposition of Islamic law. Free and fair national elections have been held twice (1999 and 2004) and will be held again in 2009. This provides a rare example of a country in which to investigate the nature of political Islam’s economic advantage.

The most prominent Indonesian political parties as of mid-2008 can be divided into two camps according to their ideological bases (*asas*). Their names, vote shares in the 2004

legislative elections, and seat shares in the 2004-2009 House of Representatives appears in Table 3.

\*\*\* Table 3 here \*\*\*

The first camp includes parties whose ideological basis is Islam. Together, these Islamic parties together received just over twenty-percent of the votes in the 2004 legislative elections.

The United Development Party (PPP), founded in 1973 as the New Order regime's official "Islamic" opposition party, is the oldest continuously existing Islamic political party in Indonesia. The party continues to attract support from Islamists, but many Indonesians perceive it to be little more than a "patronage party" (Liddle and Mujani 2007a:19) and its support appears to be waning. By contrast PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party, is one of the youngest Islamic parties in Indonesia, formed after its predecessor, the Justice Party (PK), failed to meet the minimal electoral threshold in 1999. PKS is a cadre-based party, one that eschews charismatic leadership in favor of grassroots mobilization, with linkages to similar parties in the Middle East (Eliraz 2007; Liddle and Mujani 2007a). Whereas PK campaigned in favor of imposing Islamic law in 1999, PKS has since downplayed the Islamic language of its campaign messages in favor of economic empowerment and moral leadership. Not surprisingly, its relatively high level of support in the 2004 legislative elections has been tied to the mobilizational capacities of its cadres and to its campaign appeals for "clean and caring" government. The Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Reform Star Party (PBR) are smaller parties that do attract the support of some devout Muslims, but both lack the institutional legacy of PPP and the strong cadre-based mobilizational system of PKS.

Nearly every remaining party retains an official allegiance to Pancasila (Kompas 2004).<sup>3</sup> Promulgated by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, Pancasila ("Five Principles") is a religiously syncretic political ideology based on five core values held to be common to all Indonesians. While Pancasila's interpretation has evolved over the years (Darmaputera 1988), since the 1970s the five principles have commonly been understood to be the acceptance of a single God,<sup>4</sup> humanitarianism, the unity of the Indonesian state, democracy guided by consensus, and social justice (Panitia Lima 1977).

The idea that an Indonesian party's platform is Pancasila or Islam—and moreover, that this is a politically salient cleavage in the democratic era—has historical origins. Under Sukarno (1945-1967), Pancasila was a populist ideology that emphasized national unity and progressive reform while rejecting both secularism and Islamic particularism. Under Soeharto (1967-1998), Pancasila not only survived, but was reformulated as an indigenous ideological basis for his New Order regime, rejecting communism and Islamism alike in favor of nationalism and capitalist development. In 1982, Soeharto decreed that all social organizations and political parties would adopt Pancasila as their "sole foundation" (*asas tunggal*). These included the hegemonic Golkar Party as well as the two officially sanctioned opposition parties, the officially "nationalist" opposition party (the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI) and PPP. After the fall of the New Order, this requirement lapsed, leading the PPP along with several newly formed political parties to declare that their official foundations were no longer Pancasila, but Islam. Most parties, however, retain their allegiance to Pancasila in the modern democratic period.

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<sup>3</sup> The exception is one very small party: the Nationalist Party of Indonesia–Marhaenisme. This party's foundation is an indigenous Marxist-style agrarian ideology known as Marhaenism (Pauker 1962:4-5); the party won 0.8% of the popular vote in 2004, and gained only one representative (out of five hundred) in the Indonesian House of Representatives.

<sup>4</sup> This principle is interpreted very broadly to include not only Muslims and Christians, but also Indonesian Hindus (who believe in many Gods), Buddhists (who strictly speaking believe in no God), and more recently followers of Confucianism and Taoism. In common understanding, the first principle simply rejects atheism.

Among the largest Pancasila-based parties, the Golkar Party is the successor to Soeharto's mass organization of the same name, PDI-P is the successor to PDI, PD is a new party founded as the personal political vehicle for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and PDS is a small party that attracts votes primarily from Indonesia's Christian community.

The remaining two Pancasila-based parties, PKB and PAN, are distinctly different than the others in that they are based on mass Muslim organizations that founded political parties in the modern democratic era. PKB was founded in 1998 by leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama, a large traditionalist Muslim sociocultural organization which claimed fifty million members in 2003 (*Republika* 2003). Likewise, PAN was founded in the same year by Amien Rais, a former head of Muhammadiyah, a modernist counterpart of Nahdlatul Ulama which claimed thirty-five million members in 2003 (*Republika* 2003). In Indonesia's first democratic period (prior to 1957), both Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah supported Masjumi, an Islamic party which advocated the adoption of sharia law for all Indonesian Muslims.<sup>5</sup> In the modern democratic period, neither PAN nor PKB have followed the four Islamic parties in abandoning Pancasila as their ideological basis. Instead, they have consciously remained open, multi-faith parties with nationalist ambitions (Liddle and Mujani 2007a).

### 3.2. Experimental Method

To estimate the size of the electoral advantage that an Islamic party ideology provides across different economic conditions, we conducted a large and nationally-representative survey of 2,548 Indonesians in May 2008. As part of the survey, we randomly assigned respondents to be presented with a series of hypothetical scenarios that described an electoral choice. The

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<sup>5</sup> Nahdlatul Ulama withdrew from Masjumi and formed its own political party (also called Nahdlatul Ulama) prior to the 1955 elections. Today, PBB claims to be the intellectual and organizational heir of Masjumi.

precise wording is below, with italics highlighting the experimental manipulation; the Indonesian-language version of the question appears in the Appendix:

If there were a candidate for president from a *Pancasila-based party/Islamic party wishing to implement Islamic law*, and you *believed that/were unsure if* that at party's economic policies *would/would not* develop our economy and increase the welfare of the people, would you vote for him or her?

With two party types (Islamic or Pancasila-based) and three potential economic outcomes (positive, negative, and unclear), this experimental question could take a total of six possible forms. We repeated this question two additional times, one where we changed “president” to “the House of Representatives” and the other where we changed “president” to “governor.” Our objective with these additional questions was to probe if electoral context matters—as several Indonesian regions and municipalities have enacted *sharia* ordinances in recent years, we conjectured that respondents may be more willing to support Islamic parties at the regional level than at the national level, or as the party of a single legislator rather than the head of state. Each respondent accordingly answered three questions, each of which was chosen randomly.<sup>6</sup>

Our approach inevitably forced us to make hard choices about question wording. Our choices reflect deliberate ambiguity for certain concepts, and deliberate precision for others.

The first choice is how to word party types. We chose a binary distinction between *Pancasila-based* and *Islamic* party to reflect this fundamental cleavage between parties whose basis is Islam and the remainder whose basis is Pancasila. We avoided the term “non-Islamic” because it might connote some form of opposition to or removal from Islam. All Pancasila-based parties of any national standing (with the exception of the primarily Christian PDS) count devout Muslims among their most prominent members, and none express any hostility to Islam.

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<sup>6</sup> Note, however, that the *question ordering* was not random: all respondents were asked about a hypothetical presidential candidate first, followed by a hypothetical legislative candidate, followed by a hypothetical gubernatorial candidate.

Our second choice was to add the qualifier “wishing to implement Islamic law” in order to cue respondents into the distinction between an Islamic party and other parties with large Muslim constituencies. Recall that both the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) were formed by members of mass Muslim organizations but continue to base their ideology on Pancasila. This distinguishes them from four Islamic parties that all support the implementation of some form of Islamic law (see e.g. *Jakarta Post*, August 23, 2008). Additionally, every large national party is by necessity supported by a predominantly Muslim constituency. To ensure that respondents did not consider avowedly Pancasila-based parties as “Islamic” for the purposes of our survey question, we included the modifier “wishing to implement Islamic law” in our question wording. As we note below, there is no evidence that this decision has biased our findings away from finding evidence that political Islam has an economic advantage.

Third, we operationalized economic conditions using the phrase “would develop our economy and increase the welfare of the people” in order to ensure that respondents considered the policy implications of the party for all members of society, not just for themselves. In other words, we deliberately chose not to word the question as something similar to “would benefit you personally” in order to avoid appealing to respondents’ own interests and instead cue them into the parties’ economic platforms. While we do believe that targeted appeals to personal economic welfare are important, we leave this issue for further study.

Fourth, we deliberately refrained from specifying actual parties in our questions in order to remove any chance that non-religious and non-economic factors such as leadership charisma or historical legacies (which play a large role in individual vote choice, see Liddle and Mujani 2007b) would influence respondents’ choices. Our goal is to approximate a true referendum

among ideal types, not to gauge respondents' views of particular parties. Respondents naturally may have linked the prompt to their favorite (or least favorite) Indonesian political party, but randomization prevents this from systematically influencing our results comparing ideal party types.

Fifth, for the same reason, we refrained from specifying concrete policy platforms. Again, our goal is not to impose a single conception of what counts as good or bad policies—respondents naturally differ about what these are—but to allow voters to consider whatever policies they would find appealing or unappealing as guides for their responses.

Sixth, we do not have a natural “control” group among the six treatment groups. Yet our inferences about political Islam's economic advantage are unaffected by this. All versions of economic advantage are inherently relational: an advantage as compared to some other kind of party. As our goal in the Indonesian context is to ascertain the extent to which Islamic parties have an advantage over Pancasila-based parties, we are careful to compare Islamic parties to Pancasila-based parties rather than to parties of an unknown or unspecified type.

Finally, the English translation concludes with “him or her,” which might raise the possibility that some voters would be unwilling to vote for the candidate because they will not vote for a female. However, in the Indonesian version, the third-person singular suffix that we employ (*-nya*) is gender neutral, so our question in the Indonesian version cannot be read as being associated with either a male or a female candidate.

Our survey experiment allows us to measure directly the precise quantities needed to test for the existence of political Islam's economic advantage; that is, the proportion of the Indonesian population that would vote for a party of a given type given its economic platform. However, as others have recognized (e.g. Tomz 2007:825), survey experiments such as these are

no panacea. We make no claim that survey experiments are the only appropriate methodology for studying these topics. We maintain instead that they give us an unparalleled leverage over vexing conceptual and inferential problems of the types described in Section 2 above. Indeed, we interpret the care necessary to craft our survey experiment to demonstrate that such methods *require* deep knowledge of national political contexts and specific axes of political conflict within Muslim majority countries. We return to this point in Section 5 below.

### 3.3. Sampling Frame

In advanced industrial economies, internet-based polling methods allow for easy administration of survey experiments on representative populations. Alternatively, survey experiments have been administered on select population samples such as college students (e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007; Doherty 2008) or on larger populations in advanced democracies (Clarke et al. 1999). Perhaps due to the lack of such conveniences, survey experiments in developing country contexts remain scarce.

Among developing countries, Indonesia exemplifies some of the worst of the difficulties associated with collecting survey data. Indonesia is a large country (the distance from far western Sumatra to Indonesia's eastern border with Papua New Guinea is more than three thousand miles), one comprised of thousands of islands ranging from among the most densely populated in the world (Java, Bali) to thousands of only sparsely populated ones. Moreover, internal migration among select ethnic groups (the Minang and Bugis, among others)—in addition to questionable official record-keeping practices—raises the issue of ensuring representativeness when using national census data to construct surveys. In our context, representativeness is doubly-important for maintaining the external validity of our survey experiments (see McDermott 2002:37-38).

Attuned to these concerns, we use a mix of local knowledge and national census information to construct our sample frame via a multistage random sampling technique. We use the national census to stratify our sample by the percentage of the national population in living in each of Indonesia's thirty-three provinces, and the percentage classified as urban or rural in each province. This gives the stratification weight for each province  $i$  as  $w_i$ , with  $\sum_1^{33} w_i = 1$ . The number of respondents in drawn from each province is accordingly  $w_i \cdot n$ , where  $n$  is the sample size (2,548). Within each province, we also take from the census an exhaustive list of all inhabited places (*desa/kelurahan*), which serve as the primary sampling unit. (*Desa* corresponds to village, while *kelurahan* is roughly equivalent to an urban ward.) We impose that ten respondents will be drawn from each *desa/kelurahan*, so we choose at random  $\frac{w_i \cdot n}{10}$  *desa/kelurahan* from each province, stratified by the percentage of that province's population which is classified as urban or rural.

Our next step turns to local political units to enumerate the citizens in each inhabited place. For each randomly selected *desa* or *kelurahan*, our survey teams contacted its local political leader (the *kepala desa* or *kepala kelurahan*) and asked him or her to enumerate all local neighborhood units (usually known as *rukun tetangga* or *rukun warga* in urban areas, and *kampung* in rural areas). We choose at random five *rukun tetangga* or *kampung* from each *desa/kelurahan*. Our survey teams then approached the head of each local neighborhood unit and asked him or her to enumerate each household (*rumah tangga*) in the local neighborhood unit. From these, we chose two households at random, and approached both to enumerate all household members over seventeen years of age. A single household member was selected at random using a Kish grid, and stipulated that in each local neighborhood unit we chose one man

and one woman. The total number of respondents per province, broken down by the number in urban and rural sampling units, appears in Table 4.

\*\*\* Table 4 here \*\*\*

This multistage random sampling technique exploits local political knowledge to overcome the problem of representativeness.

### 3.4. Random Assignment

The validity of our survey experiment depends on the extent to which our randomization of questions truly yields six comparable treatment groups across questions. We checked for balance across different treatment groups by examining the choice of question (which defines our six treatment groups) across a range of observed covariates comprised of responses to other questions in our survey. We were especially concerned that demographic variables, indications of religious piety (among Muslims), views of the economy, and views of politics were each equivalent across different treatment groups. We judge this to have been achieved when there is no evidence of a relationship between the responses to such questions and placement in a particular treatment group—the former being the voluntary responses of the respondents, the latter having been randomly chosen by us.

We examined a wide range of statistics to check for the existence of relationships between the experimental treatment and observed variables. We present our key results in the document “Supplemental Materials.” For categorical variables, which included some binary demographic variables such as gender or marital status as well as nominal covariates corresponding to political beliefs and religious practices, we calculate  $\chi^2$  statistics to test the association between demographic/ideational covariates and assignment to treatment groups. For continuous covariates, we estimate multinomial logistic regressions. We find no evidence of any

systematic differences among treatment groups on a range of underlying dimensions that might conceivably affect responses to our experimental questions, with one exception. It appears that respondents given the choice of a Pancasila-based party with good economic outcomes in a gubernatorial election were less likely to acknowledge that they attended prayers for the dead “routinely” than respondents given other choices, and more likely to acknowledge doing so “seldomly.” The  $\chi^2$  test rejects the null of no association at the  $p < .01$  level. However, given the dozens upon dozens of tests we have performed, we are not surprised that one is significant purely by chance. The fact that all tests save one give us no evidence that there are any observable systematic differences among treatment groups reassures us that our randomization procedure has produced comparable groups by any metric that we are able to measure.

### 3.5. Hypotheses

To capture the various conceptions of political Islam’s economic advantage, we propose six hypotheses and their observable implications in Table 5.

\*\*\* Table 5 here \*\*\*

As the table shows, the hypotheses and the observable implications mirror the substantive discussions in section 2 above. Their observable implications are measured directly, using the quantities of interest specified in Table 1.

While not our primary interest, we also present in Table 5 hypotheses about the conditioning effect of electoral context. If respondents are more sympathetic to Islamic parties in local elections or as representatives rather than for the presidency, we should expect to find that in our second and third questions, we should find higher levels of support for Islamic parties for respondents faced with Islamic parties vis-à-vis the first question.

#### 4. Findings

Figure 1 summarizes our main results investigating political Islam's economic advantage. To a striking degree, among Indonesian Muslims, parties' perceived economic platforms dominate Islamic party affiliation in explaining the aggregate political support they receive from our survey respondents.

\*\*\* Figure 1 here \*\*\*

Both party types offering good economic policies are far more popular than parties of either type offering uncertain or unfavorable economic policies. This result neatly dismisses the most "extreme" version of Islam's absolute advantage, which holds that all Islamic parties are more popular than all non-Islamic parties.

Our other theoretical expectations operate through the comparison of Islamic and Pancasila-based parties that offer the same policies. Our findings are inconsistent with the instrumental version of the absolute advantage thesis, for Islamic parties offering good policies are no more popular than Pancasila-based parties offering the same, and Islamic parties offering bad economic policies are no more popular than Pancasila-based offering the same. These same results also contradict both of the conditional versions of economic advantage—we find no evidence that respondents reward Islamic parties offering good policies more than they do Pancasila-based parties offering good policies or that they punish Islamic parties with bad policies less than they do Pancasila-based parties with bad policies. These findings hold regardless of the electoral context in which we posed our question.

In fact, we find evidence that Indonesian Muslim respondents are slightly more likely to support *Pancasila-based* parties offering good economic policies. The evidence on this count is relatively weak for Presidential elections (Panel A) ( $p = 0.061$  in a two-tailed test) but far

stronger for both legislative (Panel B) and gubernatorial elections (Panel C) ( $p < .001$  for both). Among Indonesian voters, in other words, we find some evidence of a conditional Pancasila advantage in which Indonesian voters reward Pancasila-based parties offering good economic policies more than Islamic parties offering the same. We discuss possible explanations for this admittedly surprising finding below.

For now, we turn to our attention to the final version of political Islam's economic advantage, which holds that Islam operates as a cueing mechanism for voters facing uncertainty. We find consistent evidence that this is the case. Across all three electoral domains, respondents were significantly more likely to support an Islamic party than a Pancasila-based party under conditions of economic policy uncertainty (all differences are statistically significant at  $p < .005$  in two-tailed tests). The effect is substantively rather small (ranging from 7.78 to 9.85 points), which is due to the fact that in no case did more than a quarter of respondents indicate willingness to support a party whose economic policies were stipulated to be uncertain. But we emphasize that the absolute level of support for such parties in general is immaterial for our purposes—we expect respondents on the whole to be suspicious about parties about whose policies they are uncertain, and we base our inferences not on absolute levels of support but on comparisons across levels of support for different parties.

Our first set of results accordingly demonstrates that political Islam's economic advantage is real, but that advantage manifests itself only in circumstances when a party's economic policy platform is unclear to respondents. In other circumstances—when policies are clearly good or clearly bad—Islamic party ideology confers no advantage. These findings are consistent across all three electoral contexts.

We also tested if respondents were more likely to support Islamic parties in electoral contexts other than presidential races. While Indonesia today has direct presidential elections, since 2001 the country has undergone a wide-ranging decentralization exercise that gives far more discretion to local and provincial governments than was the case previously. While Islamic parties in Indonesia have fared poorly in presidential races, they have performed much better in certain local and provincial elections. Moreover, Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) is responsible for passing and enacting laws, and the recent passage of anti-pornography legislation with the strong support of Indonesia's Islamic parties shows that legislators have a clear interest in tackling moral issues. In Figure 2, we compare the average level of support for Islamic parties across the three electoral domains.

\*\*\* Figure 2 here \*\*\*

The results show no evidence that respondents' willingness to support Islamic parties differs across electoral domains. In no cases are differences across these estimates statistically different from zero at  $p < .1$ , so we conclude that overall, whatever advantage an Islamic platform confers on a party, it does not vary by electoral domain.

To summarize our findings so far, we have shown that across Indonesia, we find scarce evidence that an Islamic ideology confers any sort of consistent electoral advantage to parties contesting in democratic elections. Rather, respondents are far more sensitive to the perceived economic policies offered by parties. We do, though, find systematic evidence that under conditions of economic policy uncertainty, Islamic parties have a small but highly statistically significant advantage over Pancasila-based parties. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that an Islamic ideology serves as a cue or signal to voters about the future intentions of parties, one that is only salient when economic policy platforms are unclear.

A criticism of our approach is that it lumps all Indonesian Muslims together. Clearly, Indonesian Muslims vary in their economic profiles, demographic characteristics, and personal views of religion and its role in politics. Might there be “subgroups” of Indonesian Muslims among whom we might find evidence that political Islam does have more of an economic advantage than a nationally-representative sample might find? While we emphasize that theoretical claims about political Islam’s economic advantage frequently are not restricted to demographic or economic subgroups, but rather are claims about all Muslims, we consider it quite plausible that such heterogeneity in Muslim political attitudes might drive our null findings for some of the hypotheses we have tested thus far. They may also help to show just in which populations we do see that economic uncertainty yields an advantage for Islamic political parties.

To investigate this possibility, we turn to a subgroup analysis of the Muslim respondents in our sample. We choose eleven different respondent characteristics which might plausibly capture relevant subgroups in which political Islam’s economic advantage might be more likely to exist. The total number of respondents per category and its proportion of all Muslim respondents appears in Table 6.

\*\*\* Table 6 here \*\*\*

The first five variables are demographic. *WOMEN* captures the possibility that there exist gender differences in support for Islamic parties—women may be less likely to support any type of Islamic platforms, even under conditions of economic uncertainty (although see Blaydes and Linzer 2008). *URBAN* classifies respondents as residing in an urban area as defined by the Indonesian census, and taps into the idea that economic dislocation and feelings of disconnectedness from the modern economy are more common among urban residents than among rural residents (who presumably remain more connected to traditional social structures)

(Kaplan 1992). *NON-JAVANESE* includes all respondents who gave as their primary ethnic identification something other than Javanese. There is a somewhat common claim that ethnic Javanese are consistently more syncretic or “less orthodox” in their religious views than other Muslim groups in Indonesia (e.g. Houben 2003:165; Uhlin 1997:64), and accordingly we test for the possibility that our null findings for many hypotheses reflect the fact that Javanese are the largest ethnic group in our sample of Muslims. *YOUNGER 50%* includes all correspondents below our sample median age of 38 years, and tests for the possibility that older Indonesians have more internalized the norms of Pancasila than have younger Indonesians raised in a time of increasingly conscious Islamization in Indonesian society. Finally, *HIGH SCHOOL* corresponds to all respondents professing to have obtained a high school education or lower.

We next turn to three kinds of economic characteristics, each of which might condition the dominance of economic policy over Islamic ideology in respondents’ support for Islamic parties. *EMPLOYED* counts only those respondents currently employed. *NO HIGH INCOME* omits from the sample the respondents with household incomes above Rp 1.8 million per month (approximately US\$193 in early June 2008). *LOW INCOME* counts only the respondents with household incomes above Rp 800,000 per month (approximately US\$86).

Finally, we examine three measures of piety and its relationship to political views. A highly influential perspective on Indonesian religion classifies Javanese Muslims into three *aliran*, or “streams,” which correspond to qualitatively different forms of Islamic practice (Geertz 1960). Members of the group known as *santri* espouse a relatively orthodox version of Islam, seen as one which seeks to purify religious practices from the influences of pre-Islamic Indonesian belief systems (Hinduism, Buddhism, and animism). The *abangan*, who are frequently rural, are marked by the continued influence of animist beliefs on their religious

practices. *Priyayi* are a small bureaucratic class whose religious practices still retain the Hindu and Buddhist influences prominent in precolonial Javanese court Islam. While the *santri-abangan-priyayi* trichotomy is properly a description of Javanese Islam rather than Indonesian Islam in general, *santri* connotes a kind of religious orthodoxy that can serve as an identifier of religious outlook for non-Javanese Muslims—most of whom tend to be more orthodox (Liddle and Mujani 2007a). Muslims who self-identify as *SANTRI* might be more open to Islamic party platforms than those who identify as either *abangan* or *priyayi*.

We also tap into the possibility that respondents vary in their willingness to accept an Islamic platform with two other variables. *PRO-SHARIA* includes all respondents who either agree or strongly agree with the view that Indonesian law must be made consistent with Islamic law. *PRO-ISLAM IN POLITICS* takes a broader view, and captures all respondents who (regardless of their views on Islamic law) believe that Islam should play a greater role in Indonesian politics. It stands to reason that if political Islam is to have a systematic advantage, it should be most apparent among these subgroups of respondents.

We present the results of the subgroup analysis in Figure 3.

\*\*\* Figure 3 here \*\*\*

To create these figures, we calculated the difference between average support for an Islamic party and a Pancasila-based party—our measure of advantage—for each of the three potential economic policy platforms across each of the eleven subgroups. For each, we plot this difference and its estimated 95% confidence interval, arranging the eleven groups horizontally. At the far left of each graph we include our results for all Muslims as a reference to show how restricting the sample changes the results. We restrict this presentation to presidential candidates; results

from similar analyses of legislative and gubernatorial candidates are available in the Supplemental Materials.

We begin with Panel C, where economic policies are unfavorable. The subgroup analysis yields consistent findings across all subgroups: an Islamic platform *never* confers an electoral advantage upon a party with bad policies. Looking to Panel B, where economic policies are unclear, we see that our findings are again remarkably consistent. Across all eleven subgroups, we find that that when economic policies are unclear, Islamic parties *always* have a statistically significant economic advantage.

Our findings do change, however, in Panel A. Across all Muslims, we found that Pancasila-based parties had a small and marginally significant advantage among parties offering good economic policies. We see in Figure 3, Panel A that this weak advantage disappears in most of the subgroups. For these, differences are very small and far from conventional levels of significance. But most interestingly, even among respondents who agree that Indonesian law must be consistent with Islamic law, we find no evidence that Islamic parties offering good policies gain more support than Pancasila-based parties offering the same. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that Islamic parties offering good economic policies are no more popular than Pancasila-based parties offering the same.

Together, these results give us greater confidence that the patterns we identify among all Indonesian Muslims hold regardless of the sample of Indonesian Muslims that we use. One drawback, of course, of a subgroup analysis such as this is that our sample size inevitably shrinks, raising the standard errors of our subgroup estimates and thereby making it more likely that we find null results among subgroups than among the general population. But the overall patterns we identify still hold. Islamic party platforms do give Indonesian political parties a

distinct advantage in terms of the aggregate political support that they receive from the general population, but only when parties' economic platforms are unclear.

## 5. Discussion

Our central finding is that that under conditions of policy uncertainty, Islamic platforms provide an electoral advantage to Indonesian political parties. But corollary findings might be of more interest to some: why, given the apparent appeal of Islam as a religion to so many of its adherents, are we unable to find that Islamic platforms produce an electoral advantage?

Our answer is straightforward and simple. Islamic piety does not entail support for political Islam. Indonesian Muslims go to the ballot box with many demands on government, of which expanding the role of Islam in society or implementing Islamic law are only some, so it is natural that we find that other concerns dominate Islam in explaining mass support for political parties. To demonstrate this, we asked respondents to choose the three most important governmental priorities from among eighteen different choices. The percentage of respondents mentioning each appears in Table 7

\*\*\* Table 7 here \*\*\*

We see that when forced to choose priorities, religious and moral concerns rank near the bottom for most respondents. Indonesian Muslims look to their political leaders to deliver prosperity, safety, and capable government. In this, they are just like voters anywhere else in the world.

An alternative explanation for these null findings is the subtle argument occasionally made that Indonesian Islam is inherently more moderate than Islam elsewhere in the world (see e.g. Wanandi 2002). This is more contentiously phrased as what Azra (2003) calls the “myth of *abangan*,” which holds that “Southeast Asian Islam is not real Islam” (39). This might suggest that our cue for “Islamic party” is too strong, so that by including “wishing to implement Islamic

law” we have set the bar too high for Islamic parties. Could our finding reflect an inherently moderate population that simply opposes the imposition of Islamic law in Indonesia? Almost certainly not. We find that 83% of respondents would support such a party if they supported its economic policies! Moreover, the baseline support for Islamic law in Indonesia is fairly high. Fully 56% of Muslim respondents (1248/2241) either agreed or strongly agreed that Indonesia’s laws must be consistent with Islamic law. (Presumably, there is an additional group that believes that Islamic law *could* be acceptable but did not believe that Indonesian laws *must* be consistent with Islamic law.) Of course, there may be some respondents who were discouraged by the mention of Islamic law. But we have no reason to believe that they outweigh the portion of Islamic party supporters who might have believed that PKB and PAN (the two parties based on mass Muslim organizations but which maintain an affiliation with Pancasila) count as “Islamic” parties had we not presented this cue.

How many respondents might have been misled had we simply used “Islamic party” as a cue? We queried respondents about PKB and PAN, asking them if these parties are Islamic parties or non-Islamic parties. Among Muslim respondents, 77% believed that PKB is an Islamic party, while 65% believed that PAN is an Islamic party. For PKB, another 14% were “unsure,” and for PAN, another 16% were unsure. These results indicate that a cue of “Islamic party” would not have adequately distinguished the Pancasila-based PKB and PAN from those Indonesian political parties that have explicitly adopted Islam as their party platform.

Moreover, we have also restricted our analysis to respondents who support a greater role for Islam in politics. As we report in the subgroup analysis above, even when we restrict our analysis to the 56% of Muslim respondents who *agree* that Indonesian laws must be consistent with Islamic law, we find no change in our results, with the

exception that there is no longer any statistically significant advantage for Pancasila-based parties offering good economic outcomes vis-à-vis Islamic parties offering the same. We are therefore confident that the strong cue of “wishing to implement Islamic law” has not biased our results away from finding an Islamic advantage.

Our results tell us several things about party ideology and political competition in democratic Indonesia. Most strikingly, they indicate that Islamic party ideology is neither necessary nor sufficient for a party to attract mass popular support. Across Muslim respondents, Pancasila-based parties with favorable economic policies are the most popular party types. In fact, our results indicate that Islamic parties must establish favorable economic policy credentials to have any hope of attracting the type of mass support necessary to defeat Pancasila-based parties. Strategies from both party types appear to have internalized these ideas, as both Islamic parties and Pancasila-based parties portray themselves as faithful stewards of the Indonesian economy—and their opponents as irresponsible, corrupt, or incompetent. In this regard, our findings comport well with existing research which has stressed the importance of economic populism and social service provision in explaining the rise of PKS (e.g. Hamayotsu 2009), but provide the first rigorous evidence against the Islamic party platforms playing a central role. Indonesian public opinion is clear: for parties seeking mass popular support, Islam alone is not the solution.

Our findings, though, do not indicate that Islam is *irrelevant* for explaining mass support for Islamic parties. In conditions of individual uncertainty over economic policies, we find consistent evidence that Islamic parties enjoy an advantage over Pancasila-based parties. This reinforces the importance of campaigning and organizing

for parties seeking to attract mass support. Parties must establish that they are credible economic managers; if they are unable to do so, leaving voters uncertain about their policy stances, Islamic parties will enjoy a small advantage over non-Islamic parties.

The implication is that to know if Islam does matter for the electoral fortunes of particular Indonesian Islamic parties, we must take into account what the mass public believes about its policies and those of its competitors. By comparing across parties the proportion of respondents with favorable, unfavorable, or unclear opinions about these parties, we can examine the extent to which parties with Islamic platforms have the possibility of further gaining political strength. We unfortunately lack detailed data on respondents' views of parties' economic policies, but we do have information on respondents' general views about several Indonesian parties.

This exercise also helps to ground our experimental findings in current Indonesian politics. Recall that Islamic advantage does not simply mean that respondents vote for Islamic parties that they view as having good policies. However, it is possible that voters can imagine hypothetical Pancasila-based parties with favorable policies, but that they nevertheless associate actual Islamic parties in Indonesia with good economic outcomes to a greater degree than they do actual Pancasila-based parties. While Islam and competence are conceptually distinct for our respondents, perhaps in real life they are not. Our hypothetical Pancasila-based parties with favorable economic policies, if this were true, would be purely hypothetical, greatly diminishing our ability to say anything concrete about Indonesian politics based on our experimental responses. Checking the actual views of respondents across different policy types will indicate whether or not our findings are vulnerable to this critique.

We summarize respondents' views of Indonesian political parties in Figure 4. We have chosen three survey items that should correlate with respondents' views about parties' economic platforms. These are not perfect indicators, but they are the best available from our data.

\*\*\* Figure 4 here \*\*\*

The most important conclusion from Figure 4 is that there are few substantive differences between the *overall average* perceptions of Indonesian Muslims about the seven political parties in question. This reassures us that our hypothetical questions are reasonable; for each political party, a large plurality of Indonesian Muslims believes that it represents the interests of both the rich and the poor and is led by capable leaders, but that it is also corrupt. It is therefore highly unlikely that respondents overwhelmingly associate actual Islamic parties with good economic outcomes, and Pancasila-based parties with the opposite. From the perspective of Muslim respondents, our hypothetical parties make sense.

Although differences across parties in Figure 4 are substantively small, they are in some cases statistically significant. But statistically significant differences vary by *party*, not by *Islamic platform*. That is, looking to Panel A, the proportion of respondents viewing PPP as representing the interests of all classes in Indonesian society is greater than the proportion believing that PD does (.661 versus .630,  $p = .03$ ), but the same cannot be said for PKS versus PD (.628 versus .630,  $p = .90$ ) or versus any other Pancasila-based party. Likewise, from Panel C, whereas the proportion of respondents who view PKS as free of corruption is larger than that for all other political parties ( $p < .001$  for all comparisons), the similar proportion for PPP is only larger than that for

Golkar and PDI-P ( $p < .001$  for both comparisons) and not other parties. Finally, Panel B indicates that the proportion of respondents who believe Golkar's leadership to be competent is higher than that for both PPP and PKS ( $p < .005$  for both comparisons), but the same is not true for other Pancasila-based parties.

In none of these comparisons can we detect any evidence that Islamic parties as a whole are viewed systematically differently than Pancasila-based parties, either those based on mass Muslim organizations or those with more avowedly pluralist backgrounds. Other party characteristics matter. PKS is perceived as slightly less corrupt than other Indonesian political parties not due to Islamic platform, but probably because of its dedicated campaign focus on eliminating corruption. Golkar's historical association with the New Order regime, the bureaucracy, and the indigenous Indonesian business community probably contributes to popular views that its leaders are comparatively better suited to rule than other parties.

Across all parties, substantial numbers of respondents indicate that they are unsure about parties. Our experimental results show that Islamic parties have an advantage only when respondents are unsure across different party types (good economic policies always trump unclear policies, and unclear policies always trump bad policies). A relatively small proportion of Muslim respondents are unsure about all parties. 8% of all respondents were unsure if any party represents the interests of all classes in Indonesian society, 11% were unsure if any party is led by competent leaders, and 14% were unsure if any party is free from corruption. These are the voters for which Islamic parties have an inherent advantage, and they tend to be older, rural citizens with relatively low levels of education. Again, these proportions are small, but a large majority of these

respondents acknowledged voting in the 2004 elections, meaning that they could prove critical in close elections between Islamic and Pancasila-based parties.

It is reasonable to wonder if our findings travel to other Muslim countries. We expect that they will. In Muslim-majority countries that hold free elections and allow parties to form and campaign as they please, we expect that respondents will be more responsive to economic and social service platforms than to Islamic party ideology, and that Islamic parties will adopt ever more serious and public commitments to capable governance to complement their Islamic platforms. The new democratic governments in Bangladesh and Pakistan appear to reflect this, as does Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, to the extent that other Muslim countries restrict Islamic parties from campaigning, inviting them to become symbols of anti-incumbent opposition to failed secular states, our findings may not hold. Still, the developmentalist messages of Islamic parties in Turkey (where elections are free but party platforms are not) and Malaysia (an authoritarian regime with relatively free elections and no constraints on party organizing) appear to be consistent with our argument.

## **6. Conclusion**

Islamic parties the world over have linked pleas for spiritual renewal and Islamic ethics with messages of economic empowerment. Some analysts have suggested that Islamic messages play a central role in explaining the rise of such parties, while others have argued precisely the opposite. We show that existing studies have not collected the proper data to adjudicate between these two possibilities, and moreover, that existing research has not presented a coherent set of hypotheses about how Islamic party messages might explain aggregate support for Islamic parties. In this paper we have attempted to remedy both of these problems, developing a

complete set of coherent hypotheses about what political Islam's economic advantage could mean and carefully collecting the exact data needed to test them.

Our findings challenge both the reductionist view that Islamic platforms play no role in explaining Islamic party support and the essentialist view that Islamic platforms always play a role in explaining Islamic party support. Adopting a nuanced view of how religion interacts with mass public opinion towards political parties in the Muslim world, we argue that Islamic platforms are a signal to voters, and as such, only influence aggregate political support when voters are uncertain about parties and their policies. Concern with economic policy dominates concern with Islamic platforms among Indonesian Muslims, but within this framework, we can identify situations in which Islamic platforms will play a powerful role.

We see this as the first step in a broad new research program on religion and political economy in the Muslim world and beyond. The problem of separating religious motives from material interests in explaining mass support is common to all confessional parties, not just Islamic ones. To be cumulative, researchers must start with a common set of shared concepts about the role of religion in mass support for political parties, develop falsifiable hypotheses based on these concepts, and use research designs that provide the necessary data to test them. But we emphasize in closing that this research must also be sensitive to the national political contexts in which religious parties operate. Our exact methodology might be appropriate for Bangladesh or Palestine, but it would yield meaningless results in Turkey, Mali, or Lebanon. Understanding the specific political environments in which confessional parties operate is the crucial first step towards developing a general understanding of how religious appeals affect party success.

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## Appendix

The Indonesian-language version of our key experimental question was worded as follows.

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita, dan ibu/bapak berpendapat bahwa partai itu punya program kebijakan ekonomi yang akan membangun ekonomi kita dan meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat, apakah ibu/bapak akan memilihnya?

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita, tetapi ibu/bapak tidak tahu apa saja mengenai program kebijakan ekonomi partai politik itu, apakah bu/bapak akan memilihnya?

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita, tetapi ibu/bapak berpendapat bahwa program kebijakan ekonomi partai itu tidak akan membangun ekonomi kita dan tidak akan meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat, apakah ibu/bapak akan memilihnya?

We supplemented this question with two additional experimental questions which replaced *Presiden* with *DPR* and *Gubernur*.

**Table 1:** *Data Required to Observe “Advantage”*

|                          |                    | <b>Support for</b>   |                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
|                          |                    | <i>Islamic Party</i> | <i>Non-Islamic Party</i> |
| <b>Economic Platform</b> | <i>Favorable</i>   | A                    | B                        |
|                          | <i>Unclear</i>     | C                    | D                        |
|                          | <i>Unfavorable</i> | E                    | F                        |

**Table 2: Political Regimes and Freedom in the Muslim World (Freedom House 2009)**

|                       |                    | <b>Electoral Democracy</b>   |   |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--|---|
|                       |                    | <i>No</i>  | <i>Yes</i>  |
| <b>Freedom Status</b> | <i>Not Free</i>    | Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brunei, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan | - n/a -   |
|                       | <i>Partly Free</i> | Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Gambia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Togo, Yemen   | Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey |
|                       | <i>Free</i>        | - n/a -  | Indonesia<br>Mali   |

**Table 3: Ten Major Political Parties, 2004 Legislative Elections**

| <b>Party Name</b>                            | <b>Vote Share</b> | <b>Seats</b> |
|--|-------------------|--------------|
| <i>Pancasila-Based Parties</i>               |                   |              |
| Golkar Party (Golkar)                        | 21.6              | 128          |
| Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) | 18.5              | 109          |
| Democratic Party (PD)                        | 7.5               | 57           |
| National Awakening Party (PKB)†              | 10.6              | 52           |
| National Mandate Party (PAN)†                | 6.4               | 52           |
| Prosperous Peace Party (PDS)                 | 2.1               | 12           |
| <i>Islamic Parties</i>                       |                   |              |
| United Development Party (PPP)               | 8.1               | 58           |
| Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)               | 7.3               | 45           |
| Reform Star Party (PBR)                      | 2.4               | 13           |
| Crescent Star Party (PBB)                    | 2.6               | 11           |
| <i>Other</i>                                 | 12.9              | 13           |

Pancasila-based parties are those which adhere to Pancasila as their ideological basis. Islamic parties are those which claim that their ideological basis is Islam. † denotes the two Pancasila-based parties founded by Muslim mass organizations. *Source:* Carr (2004).

**Table 4:** *Total Number of Respondents, by Province and Urban-Rural Cleavage*

| <b>Province Name</b>          | <b>English Name</b>       | <b>Rural</b> | <b>Urban</b> | <b>TOTAL</b> |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam      | Aceh                      | 40           | 10           | 50           |
| Sumatra Utara                 | North Sumatra             | 80           | 60           | 140          |
| Sumatra Barat                 | West Sumatra              | 40           | 10           | 50           |
| Riau                          | Riau                      | 40           | 20           | 60           |
| Jambi                         | Jambi                     | 20           | 10           | 30           |
| Sumatra Selatan               | South Sumatra             | 50           | 30           | 80           |
| Bengkulu                      | Bengkulu                  | 10           | 9            | 19           |
| Lampung                       | Lampung                   | 70           | 20           | 90           |
| Bangka-Belitung               | Bangka-Belitung           | 10           | 0            | 10           |
| Kepulauan Riau                | Riau Islands              | 0            | 10           | 10           |
| Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta | Capital Region of Jakarta | 0            | 90           | 90           |
| Jawa Barat                    | West Java                 | 220          | 219          | 439          |
| Jawa Tengah                   | Central Java              | 240          | 150          | 390          |
| Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta    | Yogyakarta Special Region | 20           | 20           | 40           |
| Jawa Timur                    | East Java                 | 250          | 170          | 420          |
| Banten                        | Banten                    | 50           | 50           | 100          |
| Bali                          | Bali                      | 20           | 20           | 40           |
| Nusa Tenggara Barat           | West Nusa Tenggara        | 30           | 20           | 50           |
| Nusa Tenggara Timur           | East Nusa Tenggara        | 40           | 10           | 50           |
| Kalimantan Barat              | West Kalimantan           | 40           | 10           | 50           |
| Kalimantan Tengah             | Central Kalimantan        | 10           | 10           | 20           |
| Kalimantan Selatan            | South Kalimantan          | 30           | 10           | 40           |
| Kalimantan Timur              | East Kalimantan           | 10           | 20           | 30           |
| Sulawesi Utara                | North Sulawesi            | 30           | 0            | 30           |
| Sulawesi Tengah               | Central Sulawesi          | 20           | 10           | 30           |
| Sulawesi Selatan              | South Sulawesi            | 60           | 30           | 90           |
| Sulawesi Tenggara             | Southeast Sulawesi        | 20           | 0            | 20           |
| Gorontalo                     | Gorontalo                 | 10           | 0            | 10           |
| Sulawesi Barat                | West Sulawesi             | 10           | 0            | 10           |
| Maluku                        | Maluku                    | 10           | 10           | 20           |
| Maluku Utara                  | North Maluku              | 10           | 0            | 10           |
| Papua                         | Papua                     | 10           | 10           | 20           |
| Irian Jaya Barat              | West Irian Jaya           | 10           | 0            | 10           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                  | <b>TOTAL</b>              | <b>1,510</b> | <b>1,038</b> | <b>2,548</b> |

**Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses**

| Hypothesis                                   | Expected Findings  |
|--|--|
| No Advantage (Null)                          | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$  |
| Absolute Islamic Advantage, instrumental     | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} < \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} < \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$                                     |
| Absolute Islamic Advantage, non-instrumental | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$                                     |
| Rewarding Islamic Parties                    | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} \geq \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$   |
| Forgiving Islamic Parties                    | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} \geq \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$   |
| Cueing on Islam                              | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Good}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Unsure}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad}} = \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila,Bad}}$  |
| Electoral Context                            | $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good,President}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good,Representative}}, \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Good,Governor}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure,President}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure,Representative}}, \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Unsure,Governor}}$<br>$\text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad,President}} > \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad,Representative}}, \text{Support}_{\text{Islam,Bad,Governor}}$ |


**Table 6: Subgroup Variables**

| <b>Variable</b>              | <b>Number of Respondents</b> | <b>Percentage of Muslim Respondents</b> |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| <i>FEMALE</i>                | 1,111                        | 49.6                                    |
| <i>URBAN</i>                 | 942                          | 42.0                                    |
| <i>NON-JAVANESE</i>          | 1,247                        | 55.7                                    |
| <i>YOUNGER 50%</i>           | 1,064                        | 48.5                                    |
| <i>HIGH SCHOOL</i>           | 2,105                        | 94.1                                    |
| <i>EMPLOYED</i>              | 2,120                        | 95.6                                    |
| <i>NO HIGH INCOME</i>        | 1,932                        | 87.7                                    |
| <i>LOW INCOME</i>            | 1,388                        | 63.0                                    |
| <i>SANTRI</i>                | 1,015                        | 45.3                                    |
| <i>PRO-SHARIA</i>            | 1,248                        | 55.7                                    |
| <i>PRO-ISLAM IN POLITICS</i> | 1,292                        | 57.7                                    |


**Table 7:** *What Should the Government's Three Main Priorities Be?*

| <b>Priority</b>                                  | <b>Percent Mentioning</b> |
|--|---------------------------|
| Increase Popular Welfare                         | 61.7                      |
| Provide Free Primary Education                   | 38.8                      |
| Decrease Unemployment                            | 37.1                      |
| Stabilize the Prices of Basic Goods              | 27.5                      |
| Defend the Integrity of the Indonesian State     | 21.5                      |
| Eliminate Corruption                             | 18.7                      |
| Provide Free Health Care for the Underprivileged | 18.1                      |
| Decrease Inequality Across Classes               | 11.4                      |
| Implement Laws Fairly                            | 11.3                      |
| Manage Natural Resources Properly                | 11.2                      |
| Improve the Welfare of Farmers and Fishermen     | 9.8                       |
| Develop Domestic Infrastructure                  | 6.3                       |
| Improve Government Social Service Provision      | 6.3                       |
| Combat Crime                                     | 3.4                       |
| Implement Islamic Law                            | 2.3                       |
| Protect Moral Values                             | 1.7                       |
| Protect the Environment                          | 0.9                       |
| Protect Minority Groups                          | 0.6                       |


Figure 1: *Experimental Results*



**Figure 2:** *Islamic Party Support across Electoral Domains*



**Figure 3: Subgroup Analysis, Presidential Candidates**



**Figure 4:** Views of Seven Large Parties † = Pancasila-based with Islamic roots. †† = Islamic.

