Religious radicalism, which intends to replace the present social and political order with one based on Islamic norms and law, has considerable though not majority support from Indonesian Muslim society.
The use of violence for religious purposes has the support of one in ten Indonesian Muslims. This percentage seems small, but it is enough to provide mass support for the extreme behavior of individuals like Amrozi, the Bali bomber, and his colleagues.
Support for the actions of several radical groups is also small but can not be ignored. Between one and two of every ten Indonesians supports the recent behavior of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Muslim Mujahidin Council (MMI). Support for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is less, perhaps because HTI is still not well known. Another reason is that the ideals for which it is fighting are more radical even if the means are peaceful. In the last two years, support for these groups has declined.
The government’s plan to “supervise” traditional religious boarding schools, anticipating a rise in radicalism, has considerable societal support. A majority support the suggestion, although a large minority rejects it. “Supervising” is perhaps a poorly chosen term. It obscures the real target, radicalism, so that there is a tendency for the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) community to reject it. Government communication on this topic in the future should be better and more sensitive.
A number of factors correlate positively with support for religious radicalism, most notably support for PKS compared to support for PDIP and other large parties (Golkar, PPP, PKB and PD). Support for radical groups correlates positively with support for radical Islamic agendas and means.
We do not know which is prior, support for radical agendas and means or support for PKS. But it is probably the former which comes first, leading to the emergence of PKS. It is probably also true that PKS activities in turn strengthen and expand support for radical agendas and means.
The strengthening of support for radical agendas and means will change the national political map. Parties that have a tendency to struggle for radical agendas will become stronger. Conversely, mass rejection of radical agendas and means will strengthen political forces that do not have an orientation toward radical agendas. Politically, the strengthening of the large parties (PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PD) can help reduce the tendency for support of radicalism; socially, the spread of anti-radical conceptions of religion will strengthen a national political map that is more open.
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18/03/2006